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Abstract
In this paper we show that sorting di⁄erent ability contestants in piece rate tour-
naments into more homogenous groups alters incentives for agents to exert e⁄ort. In
particular we show that for a given mean of the tournament group￿ s ability parameters,
larger variance (more heterogenous agents) induces higher optimal e⁄ort. This implies
that the principal can actually gain from heterogenizing the tournament groups. On
the other hand, the e⁄ect of this change on growers￿welfare is unclear because higher
e⁄ort leads to higher productivity and hence higher payment, but also increases the cost
of e⁄ort. Using broiler production contracts settlement data we empirically estimate a
fully structural model of a piece rate tournament game with heterogenous players. Our
counterfactual analysis shows that under reasonable assumptions the integrator￿ s gain
is actually larger than the growers￿losses indicating that heterogenizing groups in piece
rate tournaments may be e¢ cient.
￿We thank Chuck Knoeber, Jingfeng Lu, Wally Thurman, Fanis Tsoulouhas, participants of the conference
￿Tournaments, Contests and Relative Performance Evaluation,￿North Carolina State University, Raleigh,
March 8-9, 2008, and workshop participants at North Carolina State University and University of Zagreb for
their constructive comments.
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Tournaments are labor contracts where an individual￿ s payo⁄ depends on own performance
relative to others. There are rank-order (ordinal tournaments) such as the ones considered by
Lazear and Rosen (1981), where an individual player￿ s payment depends on her rank within
the group, and cardinal tournaments where the reward is a continuous function (typically
linear) of the di⁄erence between an individual player￿ s performance and the group average
performance. Cardinal tournaments are also referred to as the relative performance com-
pensation schemes (Nalebu⁄and Stiglitz, 1983) or the yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985).
Yet another type of tournaments frequently used in settlements of some production contracts
(e.g. broiler chickens) are piece rate tournaments (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 1999). Piece rate
tournaments are in fact variable piece rate schemes where an individual player￿ s piece rate
varies in proportion with her performance relative to the group average performance.
Virtually all real world tournaments are contests among players with unequal abilities.
When players have di⁄erent abilities, rank-order tournaments are known to exhibit some
undesirable properties. For example, asymmetries in the knowledge of abilities entail inef-
￿ciencies because contestants do not correctly self-sort into the leagues commensurate with
their types. Correcting this problem may result in entry credentials and bigger prize spreads
in leagues which target higher ability players. With full knowledge of abilities, rank-order
tournaments with players of heterogeneous abilities still su⁄er from incentive problems as
both high ability and low ability contestants tend to work less than their respective e¢ cient
e⁄ort levels. Handicapping and prize structures indexed by ability are required to correct for
these ine¢ ciencies (see McLaughlin 1988).
As for the cardinal tournaments, it has been widely believed in the literature that they
exhibit no e¢ ciency losses associated with mixing players of uneven abilities. When rewards
are linearly related to performance, better players have no incentive to stop exerting e⁄ort
once they realize that they are going to win and worse players have no incentive to surrender
once they realize that they are going to lose. Consequently, in cardinal tournaments organiz-
ers have no incentives to sort players into more homogenous groups because the incremental
1reward for improved performance (penalty for worse performance) at the margin is the same
whether a player is more or less able (Knoeber and Thurman 1994). However, as shown by
Levy and Vukina (2002), regardless of whether the agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse, an
optimal cardinal tournament is an individualized contract indexed by the ability of agents.
The welfare e⁄ects of mixing players of varying abilities in the piece rate tournaments
has not been studied in the literature so far. The best known real business world example of
piece rate tournaments is the settlement of the production contracts for broiler chickens. Our
motivation comes from observing that unlike in many sport competitions, where organizers,
in order to enhance competition, homogenize the contestants by placing them into similar
ability leagues or divisions, poultry companies generally do not attempt to place their agents
into more homogenous groups in which they compete for cost e¢ ciency bonuses. This fact
is even more puzzling knowing that via repeated contracting with the same pool of agents
for a long period of time, the company production managers can precisely discern agents￿
abilities, yet they never exploit this information to their advantage.
The main tenet of this paper is that making groups of contestants in piece rate tour-
naments more homogenous or more heterogenous creates di⁄erent incentives for agents to
exert e⁄ort. Under certain assumptions, we show that for a given mean of the tournament
group￿ s heterogeneity parameters, larger variance (more heterogenous agents) induces higher
optimal e⁄ort. Hence, the principal always wins by mixing contestants of di⁄erent abilities
rather then sorting them into more homogenous groups. The welfare e⁄ect on the growers,
on the other hand, is indeterminate as higher optimal e⁄ort leads to both higher payment
and higher cost of e⁄ort, leaving it as an empirical question.
In addition to its theoretical contribution, this paper also contributes to the growing lit-
erature on structural econometrics approach to estimating tournament models, which proves
to be quite useful for conducting welfare analyses. Recently, several papers have estimated
structural models of various type tournaments. Ferrall and Smith (1999) estimated a se-
quential tournament game for championship series in sports. Ferrall (1996) and Shum (2007)
estimated elimination tournament models for workers competing for limited promotion slots.
2Zheng and Vukina (2007) estimated a rank-order tournament model to quantify the e¢ -
ciency gains of an organizational innovation that would replace an ordinal tournament with
a cardinal one.
This paper represents the ￿rst attempt to structurally estimate a piece rate tournament
model that captures the most important features of the production contracts observed in the
broiler chickens industry. Using broiler production contracts settlement data, we empirically
quanti￿ed the welfare e⁄ects of heterogenizing tournament groups, both for the company and
the contract growers. Our counterfactual analysis show that under reasonable assumptions
the principal￿ s gain is actually larger than the agents￿losses indicating that heterogenizing
groups in piece rate tournaments, to the extent that it is practicable, may be e¢ cient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the essential
features of broiler production contracts and introduce the data set. In Section 3 we introduce
the theoretical model of the piece rate tournament. Section 4 is devoted to the estimation
methodology and the presentation of results. In Section 5, we simulate the welfare e⁄ects of
heterogenizing tournament groups using estimated piece rate tournament model primitives.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Industry and Data
The broiler industry is often considered a role model for the industrialization of agriculture.
The industry is entirely vertically integrated from breeding ￿ ocks and hatcheries to feed mills,
transportation divisions and processing plants. The ￿nal (￿nishing) stage of production
where one day old chicks are brought to the farm and then grown to market weight is
organized almost entirely through contracts between integrators and independent growers.
Large national companies, such as Tyson Foods, Pilgrim￿ s Pride, or Perdue Farms dominate
broiler contract production. These companies run their operations through smaller divisions
spread throughout the country, but mainly in the south-east.
Modern broiler production contracts are agreements between an integrator company and
3growers that bind farmers to tend for company￿ s chickens until they reach market weight
by strictly following speci￿c production practices in exchange for monetary compensation.
According to a typical contract, the grower provides land, housing facilities, utilities (electric-
ity and water) and labor and pays for operating expenses such as repairs and maintenance,
clean-up, and manure and mortality disposal. The company provides chicks, feed, medica-
tion, and the services of ￿eld men. Most of the modern broiler contracts are settled using a
two-part piece-rate tournament. In this type of tournament, the total payment Ri to grower
i is the sum of the base rate and the bonus rate multiplied by the live pounds of poultry
















As seen from (1), individual grower￿ s piece rate per pound of live poultry produced is the sum
of a constant base rate a (e.g., 3.5 - 4.5 cents a pound), and a variable bonus rate determined
by the grower￿ s relative performance. The bonus rate is determined as a percentage b of





yj and the producer￿ s individual
performance
ci
yi. Performances are measured by fi =
ci
yi, that is, settlement cost per pound of
live chicken produced. Settlement costs (ci) are obtained by adding chicks, feed, medication,
and other customary ￿ ock costs. The calculation of the group average performance includes
all N growers whose ￿ ocks are settled on the same date. In order for all growers to be
exposed to the same common production shock, the time between two settlement dates
typically does not exceed two weeks. For the below average settlement cost per pound of
chicken produced (above average performance), the grower receives a bonus and for the above
average settlement cost per pound of chicken produced, she receives a penalty.
As is explained in Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999), poultry tournaments are double-margin
contests about who can produce more output (live poultry) with the smallest possible settle-
ment cost. The growers￿e⁄ort (husbandry practices) stochastically in￿ uence the settlement
costs (feed utilization) and the quantity of output. Growers can economize with feed (and
hence settlement costs ci) by preventing spillage through proper maintenance of feeders and
4storage bins and by maintaining a housing environment that is conducive to e¢ cient feed con-
version. Growers can also separately in￿ uence output (live poultry weight yi) by undertaking
actions aimed at preventing excessive animal mortality.
Di⁄erent companies, or di⁄erent pro￿t centers within the same company, typically spe-
cialize in the production of a particular size (weight) birds and o⁄er their own contracts to
their growers. The contracts for growing di⁄erent size birds usually di⁄er only with respect
to the base rate (parameter a in (1)) in that farmers growing heavier birds typically receive
larger base rate than those growing smaller birds. Broiler contracts are always short-term
(one ￿ ock of birds at a time) and explicitly uniform such that all growers, growing the same
size birds for the same pro￿t center, receive an identical contract regardless of their past
performance, the length of tenure with the company, or any other speci￿c attribute. An
interesting feature of these contracts is that the composition of the tournaments (settlement
groups) is governed by timing and logistics of the production process and not with an attempt
to form more homogenous or more diverse groups of contestants. The random composition
of tournament groups in broiler contracts was empirically con￿rmed by Levy and Vukina
(2004).
The data set used in this study includes broiler production information gathered from the
payroll data of one company￿ s pro￿t center whose production contract corresponds to the
payment scheme described in (1). Each observation in the data set represents one contract
settlement, i.e., the payment received and the grower performance associated with one grower
and one ￿ ock of birds delivered to the integrator￿ s processing plant. The data comes from the
so called settlement sheets and contain the information on the quantities and costs of various
inputs supplied by the integrator (chicks, feed, medication, vaccination etc.), the number of
birds placed and harvested, the quantity of broiler meat (live weight) produced, the dates
when production started and terminated, mortality rates, etc.
The tournaments are separated by the settlement date, which happened to be once a
week. The settlement dates range from July 1995 to July 1997 totalling 104 tournaments.
The total number of growers is 356 and the total number of usable observations is 3,247
5￿ ocks. The average live weight of the fully grown broilers is 4.81 pounds with a maximum of
5.75 pounds and a minimum of 3.88 pounds, the average number of days that a grower needs
to grow chickens to that weight is 53 with a maximum of 79 and a minimum of 43 and the
average feed conversion ratio (pounds of feed necessary to produce one pound of live animal
weight gain) is 2.03 with a maximum of 3.38 and a minimum of 1.83.
3 The Piece Rate Tournament Model
The exact modeling of a tournament game that would simultaneously take into account both
the feed margin and the output margin is obviously quite complex, if not impossible, both in
terms of theoretical modeling as well as econometric estimation. Earlier literature on broiler
tournaments, such as Knoeber and Thurman (1994), Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999) or Levy
and Vukina (2004), ￿xed the output margin by assuming common mortality rate and the
target weight of ￿nished animals. This approach signi￿cantly simpli￿es the problem because,
assuming ￿xed and common yi reduces the payment mechanism in (1) from a piece-rate
tournament to a standard cardinal tournament, where a is no longer a base piece rate but
rather a simple salary. This way, the actual production contract is reduced into a contest of
who can produce the target output with the lowest cost (feed utilization). Since the received
theory predicts no welfare losses associated with mixing di⁄erent ability contestants in stan-
dard cardinal tournaments, this model speci￿cation trivializes our problem. Integrators do
not organize growers into more homogenous groups because this practice will have no e⁄ect
on growers￿performance and hence integrator￿ s pro￿ts.
In an alternative speci￿cation, a double-margin tournament contract can be simpli￿ed by
￿xing the settlement cost margin. Under this assumption the actual tournament becomes
a contest about who can produce more output (live weight) with a ￿xed amount of inputs.
Let￿ s consider a N￿player piece rate tournament game in which N risk-neutral growers
contract with a risk-neutral integrator the production of broiler chickens. Each grower i
(i = 1;2;:::;N) is given the same combination of inputs (chicks, feed, medication, etc.) worth











where yi indicates the pounds of live poultry produced, ei is grower i￿ s e⁄ort and ￿i is her
idiosyncratic ability (e¢ ciency) parameter. We de￿ne the grower ability in a broad sense as
inherent or acquired skills resulting from experience, education, age, etc., as well as other
grower-speci￿c factors such as location, quality, and vintage of the production facilities and
equipment.2 Higher ￿i implies that a grower can combine inputs and e⁄ort more e¢ ciently
in the production of broiler meat. We assume that from grower i￿ s perspective, ￿j, 8j 6= i,
the abilities of other growers in the same tournament, are random variables drawn from a
distribution G(￿) with support [￿;￿] and that ￿ ￿ 0. Distribution G(￿) is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable and has density g(￿) that is strictly positive on the support. This speci￿cation
captures the real-life situation where growers typically do not know who their opponents in
a particular tournament are, but know the distribution of other growers￿abilities through
repeated participation in similar tournaments for an extended period of time.
The stochastic production technology is characterized by two types of shocks. Both grower
i￿ s idiosyncratic productivity shock ui (equipment failure, sick child, etc.) and the common
productivity shock ￿ (outside temperature, humidity, feed formula, etc.) materialize slowly
during the production process. Shocks ui and ￿ are assumed to be drawn from distributions
F(￿) with support [u;u] and u ￿ 0 and P(￿) with support [￿;￿] and ￿ ￿ 0, respectively.
Both F(￿) and P(￿) are twice continuously di⁄erentiable and have densities f(￿) and p(￿) that
are strictly positive on the support. Each grower only learns ui and ￿ after the production
process is complete but it is common knowledge that the two shocks are drawn from the two
densities. Finally, we assume that ￿i, ui and ￿ are independent of one another.
1We implicitly assume constant returns to scale production technology and therefore this normalization
is innocuous. We also assume that the combination of chicks and feed is feasible, i.e., it re￿ ects the target
weight of ￿nished broilers and nutritionally meaningful feed-conversion ratio.
2For example, one grower may outperform her peers because she is younger and better educated but also
because her chicken houses are equipped with tunnel ventilation. Tunnel ventilation is known to work better
than the standard curtain ventilation in summer months when the climate is hot and humid.














and her payo⁄ function is given by
￿i = Ri ￿ C(ei);
where Ri denotes the total revenue and C(ei) denotes the cost of e⁄ort. All standard as-




i with ￿ > 0 such that the model has a closed form solution.
3.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium
When growers make decisions on how much e⁄ort to exert, the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks ui (i = 1;:::;N) and the common productivity shock ￿ have not yet been realized.
Therefore, in this tournament game, ex ante, growers only di⁄er in terms of their own ability
and have the same information regarding other structural elements of the game. In such
a case, a symmetric equilibrium is a natural outcome to analyze. The optimal strategy
e￿
i = s(￿i) is based on each grower￿ s maximizing her ex-ante expected payo⁄ with respect
to ei. After integrating out all the unknowns and assuming that all other growers adopt the
same strategy e￿




































Now we are in the position to state the following result:
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium e￿
i = s(￿i)
(i = 1;:::N) of this piece rate tournament game is
e
￿


















where E (￿) denotes the mean of the random variable in parenthesis.




















i=1 duid￿ = 0.
(5)
Using the independence assumption regarding ￿i, ui and ￿, (5) can be written as
a￿iE (u)E (￿) +































and E (ui) = E (uj) = E (u) for
any i and j. Multiplying both sides by ￿i, taking expectations on both sides with respect to




























Since we focus on a symmetric equilibrium strategy and the growers￿abilities ￿i (i = 1;:::;N)












for all j 6= i. After labeling this term





















































for any i and j. (7) can be











































3It is straightforward to show that the second order su¢ cient condition for maximization holds as well.
4The other root is automatically ruled out because M ￿ 0 by construction.























With the closed form solution for optimal e⁄ort e￿
i, it is easy to study various comparative
statics results. First, optimal e⁄ort e￿
i is increasing in ability ￿i, the base rate a, the slope
of the bonus piece rate b and the expectation of the common shock E (￿), and decreasing in
the marginal cost of e⁄ort ￿. On the other hand, the comparative static result with respect



































, increases the optimal e⁄ort e￿
i. Since ￿ is de￿ned as growers￿
ability (e¢ ciency) parameter, 1
￿ can be thought of as inaptitude parameter. This implies that
for a given mean of the growers￿inaptitude parameters, larger variance (more heterogenous
growers) produces higher optimal e⁄ort. This means that any grower i, given her own ability,
when competing against a highly diversi￿ed group of growers will exert more e⁄ort than in
situations where competing in a more homogenous group of contestants. The intuition for this
result is di¢ cult to grasp because in the piece rate tournament scheme the individual grower￿ s
payo⁄is a nonlinear function of her performance. However, it seems to be the case that if two
players in the tournament are replaced by two new players, one with extremely high ability
and one with extremely low ability, without the change in the average grower ability in the
tournament group, then the increase in the expected group average performance due to the
presence of a grower with extremely high ability seems to be outweighing the decrease in
the expected group average performance due to the presence of a grower with extremely low
10ability, resulting in an overall increase in the expected group average performance. Given a
grower￿ s own expected performance, the higher the expected group average performance, the
higher the incentives to exert e⁄ort either to close the gap (if the expected own performance
is below the expected group average performance) or widen the gap (if the expected own
performance is higher than the expected group average performance) as both situations lead
to higher payments.
Finally, we also note that the optimal e⁄ort is increasing in the number of tournament
contestants N. In our variable piece rate scheme, the magnitude of the piece rate depends on
the di⁄erence between the group average performance and a grower￿ s own performance. The
larger the di⁄erence, the higher the payment, and hence the higher the incentives to exert
e⁄ort. With small number of contestants, a grower￿ s own performance can more readily in￿ u-
ence the group average performance and hence the incentive to exert high e⁄ort is dampened
because own high e⁄ort improves the benchmark for comparison. On the other hand, in
groups with large number of contestants, one￿ s own performance will not in￿ uence the group
average performance by a lot, and hence exerting high e⁄ort would, ceteris paribus, pro-
duce larger increase in the di⁄erence between one￿ s own performance and the group average
performance.
4 Structural Estimation
As explained in detail in Section 2, our data set is an unbalanced panel where N growers
that grow chickens for the same integrator compete in di⁄erent tournaments of size N < N.
Denoting fkit as the kth (k = 1;:::;Nt) observation in tournament t (t = 1;:::;T) that records






























































varies only across tournaments due to
its dependence on Nt. If Nt is ￿xed across tournaments, then zt is also ￿xed across tour-










and E (￿) are all ￿xed constants. For
estimation and identi￿cation purpose, we also assume that E (logukit) = 0 and log￿t is nor-
mally distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2
￿. The zero mean assumptions for logukit and
log￿t can be regarded as normalization assumptions as both ukit and ￿t are productivity
shocks.
Our estimation strategy consists of two steps. In the ￿rst step, with the assumption that










￿tgkit + ￿kit (11)
where ￿0 is the constant. To avoid multi-collinearity we excluded the dummy variable for
the ￿rst grower and the dummy variable for the ￿rst tournament. Therefore, the coe¢ cient
on grower i￿ s dummy b ￿i (dkit = 1 if the kth observation in tournament t records grower i￿ s
performance, dkit = 0 elsewhere) is used to obtain an estimate of grower i￿ s ability from
(10) relative to the excluded ￿rst grower, that is, b ￿i = 2log￿i ￿ 2log￿1. Similarly, the
coe¢ cient b ￿t associated with the tth tournament dummy gkit is used to estimate the sum of
the deterministic part of the output function (10) that only varies across tournaments and
the common shock, all relative to the ￿rst (excluded) tournament, that is b ￿t = (0:5logzt +
log￿t) ￿ (0:5logz1 + log￿1). The constant b ￿0 is an estimate of 2log￿1 + (0:5logz1 + log￿1).
It is clear that 2log￿1 and (0:5logz1 + log￿1) cannot be separately identi￿ed. Since our
structural analysis requires estimates for growers￿abilities (￿i) instead of the di⁄erences in
growers￿abilities (b ￿i), a particular value for the ability of the ￿rst grower (￿1), has to be
12assumed. In our benchmark speci￿cation, ￿1 is assumed to be 1, or log￿1 = 0. Estimates
based on di⁄erent values of ￿1 are discussed in subsection 5.1 below. With these assumptions,





. Finally, the estimated residual
term b ￿kit can be used as an estimate of log of the idiosyncratic productivity shock logukit
and hence b ukit = exp(b ￿kit).
In the second step, we exploit the following relationship
￿t = 0:5logzt + log￿t ￿ (0:5logz1 + log￿1)
= 0:5logzt + log￿t ￿ (￿0 ￿ 2log￿1):
(12)
From the ￿rst step we obtained an estimate for ￿t. Furthermore, with b ukit and b ￿i estimated










can be easily constructed. Next,
note that we assume log￿t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2
￿. This






. As a result, the only two unknowns
in (12) are ￿ and ￿2
￿ and we apply MLE to (12) to obtain estimates for these two unknown
parameters. As this step of estimation uses variables generated from results of the ￿rst step
estimation, standard errors of the second step will be obtained using the bootstrap method.
This completes the structural estimation of the model.
4.1 Estimation Results
In the ￿rst step, we run the simple OLS regression of (11). The R2 is 0.9408. After estimation,
we can recover b ￿i for each grower, b ￿t for each tournament and b ukit for each observation. These
results, together with the summary statistics for the dependent variable used in estimation,
log 1
fkit, are reported in Table I.









































b ￿t ￿ 0:5log b zt +
￿


































and ￿ is the standard normal density. In the data, the base piece rate a is $0.03, or 3 cents
per pound and the marginal bonus rate b is 0.1. Estimation results are collected in the left
panel of Table II.
As explained before, both the regressand and the regressors in the second step are con-
structed using results from the ￿rst step estimation. Consequently, standard errors in the
second step estimation will be biased. To obtain the correct standard errors, we use the
bootstrap method. Furthermore, to preserve the unbalanced panel structure of the data set,
we use the nonparametric residual bootstrap method (e.g. Wooldridge 2002, pp. 380). The
exact procedure can be detailed as follows. From the ￿rst step estimation, we recover the
residuals b ￿kit for each observation. Then, at each iteration of the bootstrap, we re-sample
with replacement from the recovered residuals to obtain a new sample of residuals. The new
sample of residuals are added back to b ￿0 +
PN
i=2 b ￿idkit +
PT
t=2 b ￿tgkit to obtain a new sample
of log 1
fkit. Finally, the entire estimation (both the ￿rst step and the second step) is repeated
using the new sample of data. We repeat this procedure 200 times. The bootstrap standard
deviation of the second step parameters estimates are used as their standard errors.
Next, using the structural estimates, we are able to compute all quantities of economic
interest for each observation. The results are collected in Table III. We ￿nd that on average,
a grower exerts 3.2487 unit of e⁄ort per $1 worth of inputs and the cost associated with this
e⁄ort level is 5.86 cents. As a result, on average, a grower earns 9.71 cents in total payment
and her pro￿t amounts to 3.85 cents per $1 worth of inputs.
4.2 Speci￿cation Testing
As mentioned before, an alternative model of broiler production contracts is obtained by
assuming that the output level is constant across all growers. More speci￿cally, let￿ s assume
14that each grower has a contract to produce yi = 1 pound of poultry, which makes this
tournament a contest about who can produce a given output with smallest possible cost ci.





and the grower payment (1) reduces to a standard form of cardinal tournament









Using the same set of speci￿cations for fi, C (ei), as well as the distributions of shocks





















Compared to the formula for equilibrium e⁄ort in the piece rate tournament (4), one can
easily see that equilibrium e⁄ort in the cardinal tournament (15) is in fact independent of
the variance of abilities. This result is in line with the earlier literature which claims that
mixing players of uneven abilities in cardinal tournaments creates no problems for e¢ ciency.
Regarding the estimation, based on (14) and (15), the kth observation in tournament t






















Expression (16) further implies that structural parameters of the model can be estimated
using a two-step estimation procedure very similar to the one implemented before. The
two speci￿cations share the same ￿rst step OLS estimation, but di⁄er in the second step
maximum likelihood estimation.

















b ￿t ￿ 1
3 log b zt +
￿








































which is a function of ￿2
￿ only. Since the two speci￿cations yield two di⁄erent likelihood func-
tions underlying two non-nested models, we use Vuong (1989) test to see which speci￿cation
￿ts the data better.
The results of the alternative speci￿cation model are presented in the right panel of Table
II. We notice that the estimate for ￿2
￿ is very close to that of the base speci￿cation, and so is
the log likelihood. However, the alternative speci￿cation yields a smaller estimate of the cost
of e⁄ort parameter ￿ than the base speci￿cation. Denoting the likelihood function for the
tth observation in the second stage estimation of the base speci￿cation as l1t and that of the





logb l1t ￿ logb l2t
￿
=b wT, where b l1t and b l2t are the likelihood functions evaluated at the














logb l1t ￿ logb l2t
￿￿2
. Under
the null hypothesis that the two speci￿cations are equivalent, the test statistic is distributed
as a standard normal. Since the obtained test statistic is -0.9043, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis at the conventional signi￿cance levels. This implies that we cannot empirically
distinguish between the two speci￿cations, which is actually not surprising given that the
same set of information is used to estimate both models.
5 Counterfactual Analysis











an increase in the equilibrium e⁄ort e￿
i. This implies that the principal can gain from hetero-
16genizing the tournament groups as long as he can sell the product at a price higher than the
payment to the contract growers and as long as he does not violate growers￿participation
constraint. On the other hand, the e⁄ect of this policy change on growers￿welfare is unclear.
This is because higher e⁄ort leads to higher productivity and hence higher payment, but
also higher cost of e⁄ort. One advantage of the structural econometrics approach is that it
enables us to use the model estimates to quantify the welfare e⁄ects of such regime shifts or
policy proposals.










￿xed. Then, using the structural estimates and holding the produc-
tivity shocks at the level before the policy change, we can ￿rst compute the new optimal
e⁄ort level for each grower, and subsequently compute their outputs, payments, and pro￿ts
under the new scenario. The results from such an experiment are collected in Table IV. We
￿nd that with the more heterogenous groups, growers￿equilibrium e⁄orts (and hence their
outputs and payments), would increase by 4.06% on average. On the other hand, growers￿
costs of e⁄ort would increase on average by 8.28%, and as a result, on average, their pro￿ts
would decrease by about 2.91%. More speci￿cally, the percentage changes in growers￿prof-
its range from -22.78% to 9.86% and only in 33 out of 3274 observations a positive pro￿t
change is recorded. The results clearly show that if the principal makes the tournaments
more heterogenous, the average contract grower e⁄ort, output and payment would go up but
the majority of growers would be worse o⁄ than before the change.
As mentioned brie￿ y before, worsening of the anticipated pro￿ts may violate some grow-
ers￿participation constraint, causing them to drop out of the contract by not signing the
new contract when contracts are up for renewal. This problem can be retroactively ￿xed
by keeping the growers ex-post at the same level of pro￿ts (utility) as before the change by
paying them a lump-sum payment equal to the welfare loss caused by the proposed change.
This will also enable us to quantify the e⁄ect of heterogenizing the tournament groups on
social welfare (the sum of the principal￿ s and growers￿pro￿ts). Based on the result from
Table IV, we see that for $1 worth of inputs, on average, a grower￿ s output increases from
173.2341 pounds of chicken to 3.3653 pounds. Assuming the industry is perfectly competitive,
the principal can sell all his output at the prevailing market price. Therefore, the principal
gets an additional revenue of 7.71 cents by selling the additional 0.1312 pounds of chicken
meat.5 On the other side, on average, growers￿pro￿ts decrease from 3.85 cents to 3.76 cents,
for a 0.09 cents loss. If the principal pays back this amount as a lump sum transfer to the
growers, he would still end up better o⁄than before the change. Consequently, the net social
welfare gain associated with this policy change is positive. Heterogenizing tournament groups
by 10% results in 7.62 cents (per $1 worth of inputs) increase in social surplus. On a per
grower basis, the average settlement cost per grower in the data is 31.26 cents per pound of
chicken produced and the average number of pounds produced per grower is 240,390 pounds,
implying an average value of inputs (feed and chicks and other chargeable costs) per grower
at $75,145.91. Therefore, on a per grower basis, the increase in social welfare equals $5,726.12
(0.0762 ￿ $75,145.91).
5.1 Robustness
As mentioned above, our structural analysis requires a particular value for ￿1, the ability
of the ￿rst grower, to be assumed. In our benchmark speci￿cation, we assumed ￿1 = 1
or log￿1 = 0. Therefore, it is appropriate to investigate how would the results change if we
assume di⁄erent values for ￿1. Since ￿0 = 2log￿1+(0:5logz1+log￿1) is estimated to be 1.2515
from the ￿rst stage regression and our baseline speci￿cation corresponds to the case where
2log￿1 = 0, we now assume 2log￿1 = 1 or ￿1 = exp(0:5). The new results are presented in
Table V. Several things are worth mentioning. First, assuming a higher value for the ￿rst
grower￿ s ability, the estimates of other growers￿abilities, ￿i, become larger. Correspondingly,
the tournament speci￿c components, ￿t, become smaller. Second, the estimate of the log
variance of the common shock (￿2
￿) does not change. This is not surprising since it is clear
from (13) that di⁄erent values of ￿1 only a⁄ect the mean of dependent variable b ￿t, but not
5The 12-city broiler price average for the period covered by our data set (July 1995 - July 1997) is 58.78
cents per pound.
18its variance. Third, the new speci￿cation yields a larger cost of e⁄ort parameter, ￿, leading
to a smaller value for the average optimal e⁄ort. Finally, the alternative value for ￿1 leaves
the earlier welfare e⁄ects due to an increase in the heterogeneity of the tournament groups
almost intact. Hence, from the perspective of welfare calculations, assuming a particular
value for ￿1 is innocuous.
6 Conclusions
In many sporting events we observe the formation of leagues or divisions structured by the
approximately even ability of teams or individual contestants. For example, in European
football (soccer), England￿ s Football Association divides clubs into di⁄erent leagues depend-
ing on their strength. The best league is called the Premier League where 20 best teams
such as Manchester United, Arsenal and Liverpool compete for the national title. At the
end of each season, typically two teams exchange leagues such that the worst teams drop
to the league immediately below and the best placed teams from the league below advance
to the league immediately above. The enhancement of competition is an intuitively obvious
reason for such a prevalent practice. The motivation for this study came from observing that
poultry integrators, unlike the Football Association, generally do not attempt to homogenize
the settlement groups of contract growers for the purpose of creating more ￿erce competi-
tion among them. Instead, the composition of tournaments (settlement groups) seem to be
governed by the timing and logistics of the production process and the membership in those
groups seem to change quite randomly.
Poultry production contracts are double-margin tournaments about who can produce
more live poultry weight at the smallest possible cost. Since the exact modeling and structural
estimation of these contests is extremely complex, if not impossible, the standard simplifying
assumption in the literature so far has been to ￿x the output margin. This assumption
reduces the payment scheme in these contracts to a standard cardinal tournament where the
competition is about who can produce the targeted output at the smallest possible cost. This
19approach trivializes our problem because the equilibrium e⁄ort in this game ends up being
independent of the variance of growers￿abilities, and therefore homogenizing tournament
groups is irrelevant for e¢ ciency.
In this paper, we propose an alternative speci￿cation whereby, instead of ￿xing the output
margin, we ￿x the cost margin. This assumption gives rise to a piece rate tournament scheme
(variable piece rate) where the competition is about who can produce more output at a given
￿xed cost. Our most interesting theoretical result shows that for a ￿xed mean of the growers￿
inaptitude parameters, an increase in its variance generates an increase in the equilibrium
e⁄ort. This implies that the principal can actually gain from heterogenizing the tournament
groups. On the other hand, the e⁄ect of this change on growers￿welfare is unclear because
higher e⁄ort leads to higher productivity and hence higher payment, but also increases the
cost of e⁄ort.
We estimated both models structurally and conducted the speci￿cation testing which
indicated that we could not empirically distinguish between the two models. These results
show that there is actually a very good reason for why poultry integrators never attempt to
homogenize the growers settlement groups. Under the cardinal tournament speci￿cation, we
obtain a trivial result that homogenizing groups would accomplish absolutely nothing. Under
the piece rate tournament speci￿cation we obtain a somewhat unexpected result that hetero-
genizing the tournament groups would in fact bene￿t the integrator whereas homogenizing
them would hurt him because the average equilibrium grower e⁄ort would decline and the
production would su⁄er. Moreover, our counterfactual analysis shows that under reasonable
assumptions the integrator￿ s gain could be larger than the growers￿losses and that he can
ex-post compensate growers and still be better o⁄.
The above result suggests that heterogenizing groups in piece rate tournaments, to the
extent that it is practicable, may be e¢ cient in the sense of increasing social surplus. Now,
instead of the original puzzle which we successfully solved, we are faced with a new puzzle,
i.e., why poultry integrators do not try to assemble more heterogenous groups of growers.
Aside from the practicability of the scheme and potentially high transactions costs associated
20with its implementation, which could eliminate the formation of more heterogenous groups
from the integrator￿ s feasible option set, we can o⁄er two additional possible explanations for
the discrepancy between our results and the observed phenomena. At the same time, these
explanations provide directions for valuable, albeit very complex, extensions of the current
paper. First, in our current model, we ignore a possible violation of the agents￿participation
constraints that heterogenizing the groups can lead to, and we dealt with the problem ex-post
via a lump-sum transfer from the principal to the agents that would keep the agents at the
same level of utility as before the change. A substantially more complicated approach as well
as an assumption regarding growers￿utility from outside choice would address this problem
by making sure that the participation constraints are satis￿ed ex-ante.
The second possible extension of this analysis would be to explore whether the obtained
results carry over to the case of risk averse agents. With risk averse agents, the piece rate
tournament model does not have a closed form solution and the comparative statics results
are di¢ cult to evaluate. Intuitively, when agents are risk averse, they care about both the
mean and the variance of the returns to their e⁄orts. Since the mean of the returns is already
a function of the variance of the abilities, as we show in the model with risk neutral agents,
the variance of the returns is likely to be a function of the variance of the abilities as well.
Hence, the equilibrium e⁄ort will depend on the variance of the abilities in a more complex
way, either positively or negatively.
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23Table I: Estimates from the First Stage Estimation
Mean Standard Deviation Number of Observations
log 1
fkit 1.1683 0.1040 3247
b ￿t 1.1855 0.0988 104
b ￿i 0.9918 0.0092 356
b ukit 1.0003 0.0247 3247
Table II: Estimates from the Second Stage Estimation6
Estimate Std. Err. t-Stat Estimate Std. Err. t-Stat
Base Speci￿cation Alternative Speci￿cation.
￿2
￿ 9.7349*10￿3 9.1918*10￿5 105.91 9.4289*10￿3 1.4471*10￿4 65.16
￿ 1.1100*10￿2 1.0385*10￿4 106.88 2.7961*10￿3 3.2817*10￿5 85.20
Log Likelihood 188.8668 188.9245
Table III: Quantities of Economic Interest
Mean Standard Deviation
Rkit ($) 0.0971 0.0114
eit 3.2487 0.0286
C(eit) ($) 0.0586 0.0010
Rkit ￿ C(eit) ($) 0.0385 0.0112
6Standard errors are based on 200 iterations of boostrap.
24Table IV: E⁄ect of Heterogenizing Tournament Groups
Before After Change (%)






3.2341 0.3409 3.3653 0.3547 4.0570 0.0041
Rkit ($) 0.0971 0.0114 0.1011 0.0118 4.0629 0.2018
eit 3.2487 0.0286 3.5805 0.0298 4.0570 0.0041
C(eit) ($) 0.0586 0.0010 0.0634 0.0011 8.2785 0.0085
Rkit ￿ C(eit) ($) 0.0385 0.0112 0.0376 0.0116 -2.9093 2.1141
Table V: Estimation and Counterfactual Results when ￿1 = exp(0:5)
Estimates
Mean Stan. Dev. Estimate Std. Err. t-Stat
b ￿t 0.1855 0.0988 ￿2
￿ 9.7349*10￿3 9.2131*10￿5 105.66
b ￿i 1.6352 0.0152 ￿ 3.0178*10￿2 2.9146*10￿4 103.54
Log Likelihood 188.8667
Counterfactual
Before After Change (%)






3.2341 0.3409 3.3653 0.3547 4.0571 0.0041
Rkit ($) 0.0971 0.0114 0.1011 0.0118 4.0630 0.2018
eit 1.9702 0.0173 2.0502 0.0180 4.0571 0.0041
C(eit) ($) 0.0586 0.0010 0.0634 0.0011 8.2788 0.0085
Rkit ￿ C(eit) ($) 0.0385 0.0112 0.0376 0.0116 -2.9088 2.1138
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